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THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW*
AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT** LIMITATIONS
ON A FORUM STATE USING ITS PUBLIC POLICY
TO NEGATE PARTIES' AUTONOMY IN THE
VALIDITY OF CONFLICT-OF-LAWS
CONTRACTS
Louis C. JAMES***
INTRODUCTION
THE ISSUE DRAWN IN THIS PAPER relates to the question: Under
what conditions may the parties to a Conflict-of-Laws contract
choose the law of another jurisdiction, adequately connected with
and interested in an essential element of their agreement, to con-
* I have included under due process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment both
procedural and substantive due process. Is not a fair and impartial trial the "heart" of
procedural due process of law? Would we expect less in substantive due process of law?
The shading of procedure into substance at times makes it very difficult to differentiate
the one from the other. Cf., Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
154-193 (1949). Much of what we may denominate in Anglo-American law as substantive
was derived from procedure. The separation remains fluid. Cf., Plucknett, A Concise
History of the Common Law 354, 375, 381-2 (5th ed. 1956).
*0 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
*00 Professor of Law, The American University, The Washington College of Law,
Washington, D.C. This article is one of a series. See James, Effects of the Autonomy of
the Parties on Conflict of Laws Contracts, 36 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 34 (1959); James, The
Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict of Laws "Illegal Con-
tracts"--Sunday, Gambling, Lottery and Other Agreements, 8 Am. U.L. Rev. (1959);
James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict of Laws Contracts, 36 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 87 (1959); James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of
Conflict of Laws of Surety and Guaranty Contracts, 9 Am. U.L. Rev. 24 (1960); James,
The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict of Laws Sales
Contracts, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. 223 (1960); James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties
on the Validity of Conflict of Laws Statute of Frauds Contracts, 3 Ariz. L. Rev. 23 (1961);
James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict of Laws Contracts Involving
Capacity, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 705 (1962).
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trol the validity of their transaction, without some forum, having
little or no contacts with and interests in the contract, imposing its
public policy to negate the intended law? Unless there is some
federal constitutional provision to prevent a forum from doing
this, it would seem that all forums, as sovereign entities of the
Union, might use whatever public policy they desired to acomplish
their own interests in a Conflict-of-Laws contract. I have chosen
what I believe to be some of the main constitutional limitations
upon an unfair, arbitrary, unreasonable, and inequitable use by
the forum of its public policy,' or the policy of some other place
law with what the forum deems to be reasonable and vital contacts
with and interests in essential elements of the transaction, to con-
trol the agreement. Certain other issues may have to be developed,
as, for instance, what effect will the above constitutional limita-
tions have upon a forum's use of characterization,2 and convenient
or inconvenient forum, 3 to attain its ends?
1 I have equated public policy and a state's laws in this article. Possibly, a better
jurisprudential concept would be that law is that part of public policy that has received
community approval through the Constitution, statutes, and the court decisions-state as
well as federal public policy. In regard to states, they derive their public policy, in
addition to the above, through their own local court decisions, statutes and constitutions.
See and cf., "Justice" and "Justice According to Laws," in Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men
and Ideas of the Law 104, 105, 303, 338, 391, 533 (1953). Also, see Pound, Justice According
to Law 11 (1951). Cf., Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the
Law 98, 113-114, 271, 289, 314-316, 318, 341 (1962). See, Friedmann, Legal Theory 26, 241,
444-453 (4th ed. 1960); Chesire, Private International Law 151-157 (5th ed. 1957); Cook, The
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws Ch. XV, 388-441 (1949); Holmes, The
Common Law 35, 36, 95, 96, 116, 181, 198, 204, 205 (1946 ed.); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
21, 22, 223, 273, 520, 521, 618-621 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws
278 (2d ed. 1951); Radcliffe, The Law and Its Compass 38-41, 43-45, 47, 53, 57, 60-61, 63,
64m 78m 79 (1960). The use of policy determinants by the forum has, in turn, its own
constitutional limitations. See, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178
(1936); Order of the United Commerical Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586
(1947); Note, Conflict of Laws Contract-Enforcement of Foreign Contract Though
Contrary to State Policy, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1178 (1955); Nutting, Suggested Limitations of
Public Policy Doctrine, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 196 (1935).
2 See Leflar, Conflict of Laws 106-108, in which the author states: "It is clear that
courts handling Conflict of Laws Cases are free to decide characterization problems as they
please within the precedents laid down by their own appellate divisions, subject only to
the superior power of the Constitution of the United States. If the highest court of the
state approves a particular characterization, the determination is final unless it is found
to violate the due process clause, the full faith and credit clause, the privileges and
immunities clause, the equal protection clause, the interstate commerce clause, or some
other provision in the federal Constitution which is superior to state law." Cf., Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 1. In this area see Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to
Review State Decisions in the Conflict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1926); Ross, Has the
Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 161 (1931);
Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the United States Supreme
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My method of approach has been to develop what I consider
the underlying premise4 of constitutional construction that the
Court Under the Due Process Clause, 22 Ore. L. Rev. 109 (1943); cf., John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, supra note 1; Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, supra note 1;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). On effects of characterization, see,
Note, Conflict of Laws-Limitation of Damages in a Wrongful Death Action is Procedural
as a Matter of Public Policy of the Forum, 30 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 511-12 (1961).
s On Convenient or Inconvenient Forum, see and compare, Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 542, 549 (1935); Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 497-500 (1939); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 223, 224 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 258, 259 (1958). Also
see and compare, Norvich v. Rojtman, 5 Misc. 1029, 161 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1957); Collard
v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619 (1903); Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 105
N.E.2d 623 (1952); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1929); Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill. L. Rev.
867 (1934); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient
Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908 (1947); Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L.Q.
12 (1949).
4 My "Premise" was derived from several years of reading and trying to com-
prehend what the Court has been doing in constitutional interpretation. See, James,
The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment (1956); Mayers, The American Legal
System 98, 99, 319 (1955); Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 159, 184,
186-188, 190-199, 216-225 (1928); Curtis, Law as Large as Life 24, 25, 28 (1959); Warren,
The Making of the Constitution (1937); Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law
210, 239, 249 250 (1956); Antieau, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
122, n.2, 123 (1960); Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States
107, 108-112, 124, 126 (1946); Kelly & Harrison, The American Constitution: Its Origins
and Developments 496-830 (1947); Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolu-
tion in Retrospect 189-228 (1957); Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History
117, 165-167 (1936); Morris, Studies in the History of American Law 67-8 (2d ed. 1959);
Warren, The Supreme Court of the United States in History 1n, 350, n.3 (Rev. ed.
1937); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 78-81, 88, 89 (1949);
Symposium, On Procedure and Evidence in Honor of Edmund M. Morgan, 14 Vand.
L. Rev. 967 (1961); Rossman & Allen, What's New in the Law?, 47 A.B.A.J. 824 (1961);
Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court (1961); McCloskey,
Essays in Constitutional Law 150 et seq. (Caravelle Ed. 1957); Mott, Due Process of Law
(1926); 2 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States
1102 et seq. (1953); Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar
and Bench, 1887-1895, 6 n.9, 39-41 (1960); Woods, Due Process of Law: 1932-1949, The
Supreme Court's Use of a Constitutional Tool vii, ix, 401-404, 407-413, 417, 418 (1951);
Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 61-2 (1943); Pound, The Development
of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty 2, 47-48, 51, 66, 96-97, 106, 109 (1957) (3d
Printing 1960); Black, The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy
(1960); Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's
Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449 (Spring 1959); and cases cited therein. See also,
Shepherd & Sher, Law in Society: An Introduction to Freedom of Contract (1960);
Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (1962); Farrand
(editor), The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (1937); Bryce, The
American Commonwealth (3d ed. 1895); Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of
the United States (1913); Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation
(1956); Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States, 1826-1876 (1939);
Pritchett, The American Constitution (1959); Wu, Cases and Materials on Jurisprudence
(1958); Corwin (editor), The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis
and Interpretation (1953)-and through the office of Dr. Samuel Small, Library of
Congress, I had access to his revision notes on Corwin during the summer of 1962.
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Supreme Court may use as a least common denominator 5 in arriv-
ing at its subjective analysis and decision in a state-to-state clash of
public policies. I have assumed an equation of Order versus
Liberty6 in a federal-state relationship involving commercial con-
tracts that entails an arbiter, 7 the Court, which has to make a
subjective determination 8 of the conflicting state policy which will
control the issue.
GENERAL RULE
The Fourteenth Amendment due process of law, and Article
Four, Section One, full faith and credit clauses, as interpreted (or
construed) subjectively by the Court, will not permit9 a forum
which has insignificant contacts and interests with vital elements
5 See "A Premise of Constitutional Construction," infra at note 13.
6 See a most interesting article, Pussey, Struggle Inside the Supreme Court,
Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 6, 1962, p. 22. See n.4, supra. See, Cardozo, J., for the Court
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), in which the Justice states that,
". .. we look for general principles-for justice, but for justice within a 'concept of
ordered liberty,'" cited in Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History 4
(1960).
7 See Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951). In any federal system of government, there must, of necessity, be some arbiter
between the parts thereof when conflicts arise. The United States Supreme Court has
greatly assumed that position in the American federal system of government.
8 A learned professor of mine once stated that he doubted if "Objectivity" ever
existed on earth; everything we do is flavored by our environment--our saturated
beliefs gotten, often in childhood, are never quite eliminated.
9 See, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); First American Nat'l Bank of
Nashville v. Automobile Ins. Co., 252 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1958). The latter case involved
an action by a Tennessee mortgagee of Kentucky property against the insurers for
certain fire losses. There was an attempt also to invoke provisions of a Tennessee
penalty statute (public policy) which permitted recovery for additional expenses in-
curred where the payment by the insurer is refused in bad faith after notice and
demand. The court found that at a time prior to July 30, 1954, as an integral part
of its mortgage and loan business, the appellant bank, with two participating banks,
loaned the New Farmers Burley Warehouse, Inc., of Kentucky, $65,000, for the con-
struction of a warehouse in Kentucky, and received a mortgage on the completed ware-
house to secure the loan. The appellee insurance companies insured the Warehouse
Company against any loss by fire and provided in the loss payable clauses in their
policies that any loss or damage thereunder would be payable to the appellant bank
as its interests might indicate. The warehouse was totally destroyed by fire. Although
proofs of loss were made, there was a delay on the part of the appellee insurance com-
panies in making payment, with the result that the appellant bank initiated a pro-
ceeding in the District Court at Nashville, Tennessee, to recover its losses and to
invoke the provisions of the Tennessee penalty statute. Would Tennessee public policy
(law) be applied by the forum? The court, finding that the intention of the parties
was that Kentucky law was to apply and that the major interests and contacts of the
transaction were with Kentucky rather than Tennessee, held that Kentucky law applied.
See also, Leflar, Conflict of Laws § 127, pp. 242-244 (Student ed. 1959); Goodrich, Con-
flict of Laws 31-33 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 6-21 (1962).
Cf., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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of a Conflict-of-Laws contract to impose its public policy 0 concepts
(laws)," or the public policy concepts of any other state similarly
situated, on the agreement so as to negate the law intended by the
parties to the agreement to control their transaction so long as the
designated place law, as seen by the Court, has the most vital
interest and the most important contact with an essential element
of the transaction.' 2
A PREMISE"5 OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Is not one of the underlying motives of the federal Constitu-
tion found in an attempt by the Court to balance the equities of
states' policy-interests clashes by the equation: Order versus Liberty
in a federal-state relationship? If this is true, then when a federal
question 14 may be raised in the conflict of states' policies in a
Conflict-of-Laws contract validity issue, may not the equitable
balancing of the states' policies depend upon several factors-all
10 On Public Policy in general, see Nutting, Suggested Limitations of Public Policy
Doctrine, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 196 (1935); Note, Conflict of Laws Contract-Enforcement
of Foreign Contract Though Contrary to State Policy, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1178 (1955);
Leflar, Conflict of Laws 241-2 (Student ed. 1959); cf., Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498
(1941); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J.
736 (1924); Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 Va. L. Rev. 26 (1938); Paulsen
& Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969 (1956);
Katzenbach, Conflict on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances, 65 Yale
L.J. 1087 (1956); Leflar, op. cit. 80-83, and authorities there cited. See also, Stumberg,
Principles of Conflict of Laws 278-279 (2d ed. 1951); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 304-305
(3d ed. 1949); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 6-21 (1962). Cf., Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra note 9.
11 See note 1, supra.
12 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 9; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif.,
supra note 9; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958); and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also, note
8 supra. For this entire area of "General Rule" see: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U.S. 357 (1918); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,
supra; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra; Weintraub, Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L.
Rev. 449, 454 (1959); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 9; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389
(1924); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); cf.,
American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co., 250 U.S. 2 (1919); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
363 U.S. 207 (1960); Griffin v. McCoach, supra note 10; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Sovereign
Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938).
13 See note 4 supra.
14 For instance, due process of law, full faith and credit, interstate commerce, and
equal protection of the laws are federal questions in Conflict of Laws.
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being a part of what I call a least common denominator15 in con-
stitutional construction-namely, the reasonableness, fairness,
justice, and non-discrimination, as subjectively seen by the Court,
in the use by the forum of its policy determinants to negate the
parties' intended place law of a state reasonably having the most
significant interest in an essential element of the transaction? May
not the Court's weighing of contacts and interests of the respective
states connected with the transaction be considered the most
logical and equitable means of arriving at a fair and just decision?
Then, if one state,' 6 not the forum, has the most important con-
nections with essential elements of the transaction, and has the
most vital interests in the agreement, is it not equitable that its
policies should control the validity of the contract when the parties
desire that place law to control? On the other hand, and irrespec-
tive of the parties' attempt to stipulate a place law to control the
instrument, if the states respectively connected with and interested
in essential elements of the transaction have contacts and interests
somewhat in balance, the forum being one of those states, might
not the Court likewise view as inequitable, unfair, unjust, and
discriminatory the negation of the forum's strong policy deter-
minants in the decision?'7
Where, in the ultimate, 8 would the United States Supreme
Court look for an interpretation of such factors as "fairness,"
15 Although constitutional construction may require refinements of a general base-
the least common denominator-as different constitutional issues are raised in particular
factual situations, it would seem that these refinements stem from equitable principles
of balancing states' policies in Conflict-of-Laws questions.
16 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Although this substantive due
process of law case involved Texas and a foreign nation, Mexico, it seems that the
Court, in ascertaining interests and contacts, would not make any material distinction
between a state of the American Union and a foreign nation.
17 Cf., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 12.
18 See, Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law
(1962), in which this learned author states: "There are two cardinal problems in the
realm of interpreting constitutional precepts which cannot be solved without some
reflection on the ultimate ends of legal ordering. The first is the question of whether
uncertainties regarding the meaning of a constitutional provision should be resolved
by recourse to the understanding of the provision which was prevalent at the time of
its adoption or whether a constitutional provision should be interpreted in the light
of knowledge, needs, and experience existing at the time when the interpretive decision
is rendered." Id. at 348. In any event, no two men are likely to see the same factual
situation alike. All biographies are written with much uncertainty. I use "ultimate,"
therefore, in view of any decision in life by any person being his own analysis of the
facts before him; often, this analysis may be no more than a surmise. No man is in-
fallible.
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"reasonableness," "justice," and "non-discrimination," which may
constitute the least common denominator of constitutional con-
struction, but to its own subjective 9 views of such factors? Even
an historical construction 20 of the Constitution must evaluate the
use and meanings of the English language translated into legal
concepts in different periods of history as men of those periods
saw the concepts. As objective as one may wish to be, is it pos-
sible to disassociate entirely anyone from environment and early
saturated beliefs?21 May not constitutional meanings, as well as
emphasis on those meanings, shift in time and space22 in the balanc-
ing of the equities of the social unit as new needs and desires of
the American people demand either new laws or new interpreta-
tions of old laws? Are "equities" themselves absolutes or rather
pragmatic norms of the mores of a people in time and space? (Could
the Founding Fathers of this nation, for instance, in drafting the
Constitution, have foreseen the complexities of life in an atomic
civilization of 1964?) Are not the legal concepts of due process of
law,23 and full faith and credit 24 excellent tools to aid the Court in
the balancing of the "equation"? Does not nature itself abhor an
imbalance 25 in any equation of life? If law is a tool of politically
19 Note 8 supra.
20 A reading of any worth-while text on Legal History will cause the reader to
agree with this statement. See, for instance, Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common
Law (1956), and compare with my statement.
21 See Mosca, The Ruling Class 50-69 (1st ed. 1939, translated by Hannah D. Kahn);
Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite" 54-61 (1958). See
also, Bowle, Western Political Thought (1948); Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in
Legal and Social History and Philosophy (Hanley trans. 1947); Coker, Recent Political
Thought (1934); Berman, The Nature and Function of Law: An Introduction for
Students of the Arts and Sciences (1958); MacIver, The Web of Government (1947);
Maine, Ancient Law (3d American ed. 1883).
22 Note 4 supra.
23 See asterisk no. 1 supra.
24 See asterick no. 2 supra. See also on full faith and credit, Abel, Administrative
Determinations and Full Faith and Credit, 22 Iowa L. Rev. 461 (1937); Childs, Full
Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause, 36 Ky. L.J. 30 (1947); Corwin, The Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 371 (1933); Costigan, Article IV, Section 1, of
the Constitution, 4 Colum. L. Rev. 470 (1904); Page, Full Faith and Credit: The Dis-
carded Constitutional Provision, 1948 Wis. L. Rev. 265; Radin, The Authenticated Full
Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1944); Ross, 'Full Faith and
Credit' in a Federal System, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 140 (1936); Sumner, The Full Faith and
Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 Ore. L. Rev. 224 (1955); Moore & Oglebay,
The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 Va. L. Rev. 557 (1943); Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev.
1, 16, 17, 26, 27 (1945). See also note 4 supra.
25 A study of high altitudes in mountainous areas with nearby great ocean depths
will be noted in any work of Geology. Nature demands a balance.
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organized society designed to carry out the needs and wishes of a
people in time and space,28 is it not incumbent on the Court27 to
try to find the goals of the people at any given time and space and
mold the law by construing it to fit those demands? Are the "dead
hands" of a past culture forever to bind down the living needs and
desires of a living culture by sterilized principles of stare decisis
when life requirements have changed?28 (It may be questioned as
to how far law would be advanced today unless, in the history of
Anglo-American legal institutions, the courts of the past had not
bridged gulfs in the law by liberal legal construction and even, at
times, by legal fictions.) 29
However, since the Supreme Court is composed of humans,
not Gods,80 is it not likely in this attempt to balance the "equation"
that it may construe the Constitution as it subjectively3' sees the
26 This is my definition of law, based, in some respects, upon Pound's theory of
Social Engineering.
27 Even with all due deference to legislative enactments by a duly elected democratic
assembly, it is impossible for the legislatures of any people continuously to change the
laws to meet the case-to-case decisions that occur from day to day. Legislatures are often
too slow in the procedures to meet the requirements of the moment confronting hun-
dreds of judges each day on the bench. Further, the English language not being a
science of mathematical exactness, courts have to make law by interpretation to fit the
needs of the case; governed, as courts are, by principles of stare decisis, they still must
orient the judiciary to the changing needs of the times by the interpretative process.
Legislative intent has to be highly theoretical because cases arise under enactments
passed possibly 100 years past when the legislatures could not have possibly contemplated
such matters arising under the enactment.
28 Although we need certainty in law, we must not strait-jacket it in the past so
that it will die like a gourd on the vine in the fall. Law must be alive to meet the
needs of the present even though in meeting those needs it may refer for guidance to
the deeds of the past. Compare, Locke, Of Civil Government, Book II, An Essay Con-
cerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government (Everyman's Library,
Edited by Ernest Rhys, 1943)- "[N]othing being necessary to any society that is not
necessary to the ends for which it is made." Id. at 157.
29 See and compare, Goodrich, Foreword 247, in Reese & Galston, Doing an Act
or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (1959),
in which Judge Goodrich states in reference to a power basis of jurisdiction: "But the
blunt physical power doctrine has already become fictionalized when insistence on
continued physical presence is abandoned as a decency of civilization. The rule of
law is none the worse for that; the books are full of instances where growth has come
by pretending that something is true when everybody knows it is not, as for instance,
that the island of Minorca is in Cheapside, London." The judge continued: "And fic-
tions regarding jurisdiction over foreign corporations have been plentiful as Falstaff's
blackberries. Thus, the corporation is intangible, artificial, and cannot move from its
state of incorporation; it consents to be sued when in fact it does no such thing; it is
present everywhere it does business." Id. at 248.
30 All men are fallible. Since the Supreme Court is composed of men, it too is
subject to error. But in defense of the Court, we should not forget the words of Jesus: "He
that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone .... " The Holy Bible, St. John
VIII, 7, 76 (King James (Authorized) Version, no date).
31 See note 8, 18, 21, supra.
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goals of the law in attaining the needs and desires of the people
at any given time and space? If my assumptions are accurate, then
the decisions of the Court in a Conflict-of-Laws contractual arrange-
ment should be crystal clear (at least, insofar as legal concepts82 of
the abstract proportion as those of due process of law and full faith
and credit can ever be made clear and definite), but for the human
factor of each Justice of the Court individually and subjectively
viewing differently the goals of Constitutional Law in obtaining
the needs and desires of the people in time and space. 83 Let us now
turn to the cases.
DUE PROCESS-OF-LAW CASES
We shall first consider jurisdictional issues of procedural due
process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment as they may pertain
to our problem. Unless a court has jurisdiction, how can its deci-
sions be valid?
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,34 points up the balanc-
ing of the equity-policy factors in the equation of Order versus
Liberty in a federal-state relationship. It points up the concern
of the Court that the factors of the least common denominator in
Constitutional construction, namely justice, equity, fairness, rea-
sonableness, and non-discrimination, must be observed at all costs
in cases involving the "due-process clause." Vital interests and
vital contacts are weighed on the scales of "due-process-clause"
jurisdiction in an in personam action.
The following facts in International Shoe are, among others,
of significance. Appellant was a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business located in St. Louis. It had solicitors in
the state of Washington, who exhibited and took orders for mer-
chandise, forwarding those orders to St. Louis where they might
be accepted or rejected, and, if accepted, the merchandise was
shipped f.o.b. from St. Louis or other out-of-Washington-state
points to customers in the state of Washington. Collections were
made for the merchandise at the place of shipment outside of Wash-
ington. Except for the above contacts with Washington, it appears
82 See and compare asterisk 2 supra, and notes 4, 23, 24 supra.
83 See and compare note 4, 18 supra.
34 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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that no business was done by appellant in that state. When the
state attempted to collect by action, under a Washington statute
(public policy), certain unemployment taxes in Washington from
the appellant by service of process upon the sales solicitor, the
company resisted and raised the issue of "due process," stating it
was not doing business in Washington and had no employees there
upon whom service could be had. Copy of the notice of suit was
duly sent to appellant in St. Louis by registered mail. Did the
Washington state statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause?
The Court spoke through Mr. Justice Stone (later Chief
Justice):
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of
business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture
and sale of shoes and other footwear. It maintains places of busi-
ness in several states, other than Washington, at which its manufac-
turing is carried on and from which its merchandise is distributed
interstate through several sales units or branches located outside
the State of Washington.3 5
Continued the Court:
Appellant has no office in Washington and makes no contracts
either for sales or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no
stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of
goods in intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to 1940,
now in question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen salesmen
under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in
St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington; their principal
activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated by
commission based upon the amount of their sales [in Washington].
The commissions for each year totaled more than $31,000. Appel-
lant supplies its salesmen with a line of samples, each consisting of
one shoe of a pair, which they display to prospective purchasers.
On occasion they rent permanent sample rooms, for exhibiting
samples, in . . . buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or... buildings
temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals is reimbursed
by appellant.36
The State of Washington contended that these contacts of the
state with these transactions amounted to the corporate appellant
doing business in the state for purposes of suit in the collection
of unemployment taxes. Appellant contended that Washington was
35 Id. at 313.
36 Id. at 313-314.
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without jurisdiction; that in its attempt to obtain in personam
jurisdiction, it violated the due process clause.
Said Mr. Justice Stone:
..due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463. See Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91. Com-
pare Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316, 319. See
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352; Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253.3Y
Then the Court pointed up further the requirements of due
process. Its (due process) demands
... may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state
of the forum as makes it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there. An "estimate of the incon-
veniences" [could this be that due process is also concerned with
forum non conveniens as one of its factors?] which would result
to the corporation from a trial away from its "home" or principal
place of business is relevant in this connection. Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, supra 141 [45 F.2d 139, 141]. 38
After considering some of the contacts with a state which will
permit jurisdiction without violation of due process, the Court
stated:
Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional acts
of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation
or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon
the state authority to enforce it ..... other such acts, because of
their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission,
may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit.
[Could the Court have reference here to the significance of vital
interests the forum might have in the transaction such that by the
very nature of this interest lesser contacts at times would provide
jurisdiction than at other times when the state's interests were not
so significant? How would the Court determine the significance of
the forum's interests except by a subjective appraisement?]39
The Court continued that it is not the quality of the acts but
".... more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were
of such a nature as to justify the fiction. "40 of consent being
37 Id. at 316.
38 Id. at 317.
39 Id. at 318.
40 Ibid.
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implied. What is this, but an implication of the Court's jurisdic-
tional determination in each case by subjective appraisement?
Then the Court, as if in summary of its views on due process,
stated:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corpora-
tion to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical
or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been sug-
gested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to
procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a
little less .... Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no con-
tacts, ties, or relations. . . . But to the extent that a corporation
exercises the privileges of conducting activities within a state, it
enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. [The
Court, it seems, might have said, "We may measure the state's
vital interests accordingly." The exercise of that privilege may
give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out
of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.41
[The Court, it appears, might have said, "We always consider
the policies' equities in any federal-state relationship involving the
equation of Order versus Liberty."]
Since the Court found, in balancing the policy equities of the
equation, that the activities of the corporation carried on in the
state of Washington were neither casual nor irregular, but sys-
tematic and continuous for a sizeable period of time, and repre-
sented a sizeable sum of money in commissions paid, it found that
the state's statute (policy) was not in violation of due process of
law.
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,4 Lulu B.
McGee, petitioner, obtained a judgment in a state court of Cali-
fornia against International Life Insurance Company, respondent,
on an insurance contract. No process was served upon respondent
in California; it appears, though, that notice of suit was sent to
respondent at its principal place of business in Texas by registered
mail. The state court based its jurisdiction on a local statute (public
41 Id. at 319.
42 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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policy) which subjected foreign corporations to actions in the state
on contracts of insurance with residents of the state (vital interests
here in residents of state getting a fair deal) even though such
foreign corporations could not be served with process within the
state.
After the judgment, which appeared uncollectible in Cali-
fornia, petitioner went to Texas where she filed an action on the
judgment in a local state court. The local courts of Texas refused
to enforce the out-of-state judgment, holding it was invalid under
the Fourteenth Amendment upon the premise that process outside
California could not give California courts jurisdiction over the
respondent. Of course, if the California courts exercised jurisdic-
tion properly over respondent then it appears that Texas courts
erred in not accrediting full faith and credit to the out-of-state
judgment.
Said the Court:
The material facts are relatively simple. In 1944, Lowell Franklin,
a resident of California, purchased a life insurance policy from the
Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona corporation. In
1948, the respondent agreed with Empire Mutual to assume its in-
surance obligations. Respondent then mailed a reinsurance cer-
tificate to Franklin in California offering to insure him in accord-
ance with the terms of the policy he held with Empire Mutual.
He accepted this offer and from that time until his death in 1950
paid premiums by mail from his California home to respondent's
Texas office. Petitioner, Franklin's mother, was the beneficiary
under the policy. She sent proofs of his death to the respondent but
it refused to pay claiming that he had committed suicide. It appears
that neither Empire Mutual nor respondent has ever had any office
or agent in California. And so far as the record before us shows,
respondent has never solicited or done any insurance business in
California apart from the policy involved here.43
The Court then quoted from the Shoe case,
... due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the ter-
ritory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." 44
The Court then found that a state's jurisdiction in this time of
43 Id. at 221-222.
44 Id. at 222, citing from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945).
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expanding national commerce is, in essence, at best a pragmatic
thing. Fundamental concepts of due process were not offended
here. Said the Court:
It is sufficient for the purpose of due process that the suit was based
on a contract which had substantial connections with that State
[California]. . . The contract was delivered in California, the
premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident
of that State [California] when he died. It cannot be denied that
California had a manifest interest [vital interest] in providing ef-
fective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage
if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant
State in order to hold it legally accountable. [Here, once more,
we find the Court considering the convenient or inconvenient
forum, as factors in jurisdictional bases.] When claims were small
or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the
cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making
the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witness-as here
on the company's defense of suicide-will be found in the insured's
locality. Of course, there may be inconveniences to the insurer if
it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract
but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process....
There is no contention that respondent did not have adequate
notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and
appear.45
Then the Court, through the process of characterization (de-
termination),46 put the double knot in the appendectomy T by
finding that the statute (public policy) of California became law
in 1949, which was after the respondent had entered into the con-
tract with Franklin to assume Empire's obligation to him; and
that respondent's contention that the application of the California
law to the existing agreement would improperly impair obligations
under the agreement was not true since,
We believe that the contention is devoid of merit. That statute
[public policy] was remedial, in the purest sense of that term, and
neither enlarged nor impaired respondent's substantive rights or
obligations under the contract. It did nothing more than to pro-
vide petitioner with a California forum to enforce whatever sub-
stantive rights she might have against respondent.48
45 355 U.s. at 223-224.
46 I have found in class lecturing that the students grasp with more ease the
concept "Determination" than they do the concepts of "Qualification," "Classification,"
or "Characterization."
47 A former teacher of mine stated that a great surgeon once told him that he
always tied the second knot in an appendectomy so that he could rest assured that
the case was secured so far as the operation procedures required. It was the final thing
to do in order to "fix the operation."
48 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
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Therefore, the Court ruled that Texas must give full faith and
credit to the California judgment since there was no violation by
the California public policy (statute law) of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Hanson v. Denckla49 case merely reinforces the jurisdic-
tional bases discussed above. Mrs. Donner, while a domiciliary of
Pennsylvania, executed in Delaware a revocable deed of trust
which made a Delaware trust company trustee of certain securities.
Mrs. Donner reserved the income therefrom for life and provided
that the remainder should be paid to such persons as she should
designate by an inter vivos or testamentary instrument. After some
years, she became domiciled in Florida and later died there. In
Florida she executed the inter vivos instrument by which she ap-
pointed certain beneficiaries to receive a stipulated sum of money
of the trust estate and executed also a will which contained a
residuary clause covering inter alia ". . . all property, rights and
interests over which I may have power of appointment which prior
to my death has not been effectively exercised by me .... 50 In a
Florida proceeding, in which the Delaware trust company did not
appear, but was given notice of the suit only by mail and publica-
tion, a Florida state court held that the trust and power of appoint-
ment were ineffectual by Florida law (public policy) and that the
stipulated sum above passed under the residuary clause of the will.
The Florida Supreme Court sustained this rule. In doing so, the
Florida Supreme Court also held that Florida had jurisdiction
over the nonresident Delaware trust company; and that under
Florida law (public policy), the trust company was an indispensable
party to the action. In the meantime, a Delaware court, in which a
declaratory judgment had been instituted to clear these matters,
with personal jurisdiction over the trust company, sustained the
trust and inter vivos appointment. It held that the parties desig-
nated therein were entitled to the above-stipulated sum. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court sustained. Delaware had denied full faith and
credit to the Florida decree. Certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court.
The Court, after stating that the question before it should be
49 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
50 Id. at 240.
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characterized (determined) as pertaining to the validity of the trust
rather than the appointment in Florida, found that there were in-
sufficient contacts of the trust company with Florida for that state
to entertain personal jurisdiction in the case; that the trustee was a
necessary party under Florida public policy (law); that, therefore,
in personam jurisdiction had to be declared invalid in Florida even
to those parties there before the court; that because of the viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
Florida, full faith and credit was not violated and did not need to
be considered. Further, the Court found that the question of in
rem jurisdiction was equally defective from a Florida standpoint
since the securities were always apparently in Delaware and had
their situs there.
Said the Court:
But jurisdiction cannot be predicated upon the contingent role
of this Florida will [will was probated in Florida]. Whatever the
efficacy of a so-called "in rem" jurisdiction over assets admittedly
passing under a local will, a State acquires no in rem jurisdiction
to adjudicate the validity of inter vivos dispositions simply because
its decision might augment an estate passing under a will probated
in its courts.51
Continued the Court in much the same vein of thought in regard
to in rem jurisdiction:
The settlor-decedent's Florida domicile is equally unavailing as a
basis for jurisdiction over the trust assets. For the purpose of juris-
diction in rem the maxim that personalty has its situs at the domi-
cile of its owner is a fiction of limited utility.5 2
Thus, Florida was found not to have in rem jurisdiction apparently
based upon the insignificance of contacts and interests of the trans-
action with that state.
In a return to a consideration of in personam jurisdiction, the
Court readily admitted that the concept of in personam jurisdic-
tion was expanding due to the needs and wants of the people in
time and space by virtue of technological progress and the freer
flow of trade in the United States. Then, it asked, how could
Florida have jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company? What
contacts of the transaction were with Florida? The Court also ad-
51 Id. at 248.
52 Id. at 249.
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mitted that by means of freer flow of trade there was a concomi-
tantly easier means of access to suits by defendants. Again, we ob-
serve the Court interested in a convenient forum as a factor in
considering bases of jurisdiction.
Next, the court stated that:
In response to these changes [in times, needs, and wants of the
people of America], the requirements of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Nef,
95 U.S. 714, to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310. But, it is a mistake to assume that this
trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on personaljurisdiction of state courts. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
416, 418. Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity
from inconvenient or distant litigation. [May we not ask, is not the
Court impliedly saying that we may consider the convenience of
the forum as a factor of jurisdiction even though we are not ready
to make it the main or only factor of jurisdiction?] They are a
consequence of extraterritorial limitations on the powers of the
respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so un-
less he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him. See International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319.r 8 [Did the Court include
in 'minimal contacts' 'vital interests'?]
Let us see what contacts this transaction had with Florida, reasoned
the Court:
We fail to find such contacts in the circumstances of this case. The
defendant trust company has no office in Florida, and transacts no
business there. None of the trust assets has ever been held or ad-
ministered in Florida, and the record discloses no solicitation of
business in that State either in person or by mail. Cf. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310; McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643. 5 4
Continued the Court:
The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act
done or transaction consummated in the forum State. In that re-
spect, it differs from McGee v. International Life Insurance Com-
pany, 355 U.S. 220, and the cases there cited. In McGee, the non-
resident defendant solicited a reinsurance agreement with a
resident of California. The offer was accepted in that State and
the insurance premiums were mailed from there until the insured's
death. Noting the interest California has in providing effective
redress for its residents when nonresident insurers refuse to pay
58 Id. at 251.
54 Ibid.
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claims on insurance they have solicited in that State, the Court up-
held jurisdiction because the suit "was based on a contract which
had substantial connections with that State." In contrast, this
action [in the case at bar] involves the validity of an agreement
[Characterization may have turned the case at this point.] that was
entered without any connection with the forum State. The agree-
ment was executed in Delaware by a trust company incorporated
in that State and a settlor domiciled in Pennsylvania. The first
relationship Florida had to the agreement was years later when the
settlor became domiciled there, and the trustee remitted the trust
income to her in that State. From Florida Mrs. Donner carried on
several bits of trust administration that may be compared to the
mailing of premiums in McGee. But the record discloses no in-
stance in which the trustee performed any acts in Florida that bear
the same relationship to the agreement as the solicitation in
McGee. Consequently, thus it cannot be said to be one to enforce
an obligation that arose from a privilege the defendant exercised
in Florida.55
Also, stated the Court, in the McGee case the state of Califor-
nia had a special statute in such matters which indicated a special
interest of California in that type of case. Again, the Court comes
back to its characterization as a major determining point in the
case.
The execution in Florida of the power of appointment under
which the beneficiaries and appointees claim does not give Florida
a substantial connection with the contract on which this suit is
based. It is the validity of the trust agreement, not the appointment
that is at issue here.56 [Emphasis supplied.]
Characterization is, therefore, of great significance in the deter-
mination of jurisdiction. Continued the Court:
[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the de-
fendant purposefully (sic) avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws ... 57
for the foundation to be laid of in personam jurisdiction. In order
to obtain jurisdiction, Florida must show that the acts of the
trustee had a substantial connection with Florida; and that Florida
had a vital interest in the transaction. This was not shown. The
majority opinion stated that since the Florida judgment was invalid
in Florida because of a lack of due process, Delaware did not have
to give full faith and credit to the Florida judgment.
55 Id. at 251-252.
56 Id. at 253.
57 Ibid.
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Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, 58 found that there were sufficient
contacts of the transaction with Florida, as well as vital Florida
interests in the transaction such that there was no violation of due
process of law. He observed that while jurisdiction is quite differ-
ent from choice of law, yet the bases of both are very similar. Jus-
tice Black also stated that the only possible drawback to Florida
due-process jurisdiction was a proper evaluation and consideration
of whether the litigation in Florida ". . . would impose such a
heavy and disproportionate burden on a non-resident defendant
that it would offend what this Court has feferred to as 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "59 Again, we find the
convenient or inconvenient forum an essential element of jurisdic-
tion. However, Black observed that we have not reached a point
where state boundaries have no significance. (In other words, we
still have some federalism left; states are not yet administrative
adjuncts of the national policy. How soon they may become such
is again, apparently, left to the needs and desires of the people in
time and space.)
Justices Burton and Brennan concurred" with Justice Black
in the dissent. Justice Douglas wrote a separate6 dissent in which
he apparently found sufficient contacts of Florida with the trans-
action by a characterization of the trust and will as so interwoven
as to be practically one and the same contact with Florida. Florida's
interest was, therefore, characterized by Justice Douglas as sig-
nificant, if not more so, than that of Delaware. The privity of the
trustee with the decedent's interest made the trustee's interest
identical, for all practical purposes, with that of the decedent; he
was in essence a mere custodian rather than a person involved
individually and personally. Stated Douglas: "The question in
cases of this kind is whether the procedure is fair and just, con-
sidering the interests of the parties." 62
An analysis of these three cases indicate several vital facts.
Characterization by the Court in opposition to the state court's
characterization may turn the decision; thus, in effect, a state
58 357 U.S. at 256.
59 Id. at 259.
60 Id. at 256.
61 357 U.S. at 262.
62 Id. at 263.
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court's characterization is limited by constitutional construction.
May not characterization be used by either a state court or the
United States Supreme Court as a choice of law 8 in disguise, as
well as a means for choice of jurisdiction, much as public policy
itself may be used as a disguise for choice of law effects?6 4 If this is
true, may we not assume that choice of law by characterization
may be a means of arriving at bases of jurisdiction 5 as well as
choice of jurisdiction used to arrive at what a court may think the
proper choice of law?66 In any event, may we not assume that
characterization is one of the major elements in some Conflict-of-
Laws decisions? May we not further assume that a policy decision
by a state court is thus limited by a greater policy decision by the
Court by means of characterization as a basis for formulating
jurisdiction?
Also, may we not assume that a convenient or inconvenient
forum is a vital element6 7 in jurisdictional findings? May we not
equally suppose that a policy decision by a state court via con-
venient or inconvenient forum, in turn, may be checkmated by a
contrary constitutional construction68 by the Court either by first
63 It is debatable if this was not done in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Cf., Sovereign Camp. v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938). It appears that characterization may
have turned the decision in Poison v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897). Charac-
terization also played an important part in the decision of Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90
Ark. 351, 119 S.W. 75 (1909); cf., characterization of a state court with that of the
Supreme Court in Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, supra. On characterization in general,
see, Robertson, A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws,
52 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1939); Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualification and the Conflict of
Laws, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 247 (1920); Ledermann, Classification in Private International
Law, 29 Can. B. Rev. 3 (1951); Falconbridge, Conflict Rule and Characterization of
Question, 30 Can. B. Rev. 103 (1951); Cook, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws,
51 Yale L.J. 191 (1941); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 210-
238 (1949); Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 1027 (1949);
Leflar, Conflict of Laws 93-108 (Student ed. 1959); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 327-328
(1962); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 15-17 (3d ed. 1949).
64 See and compare, Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56
Colum. L. Rev. 969 (1956).
65 Cf., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
66 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 63. See also and compare, International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). "Cold print" may not always reflect what
or how the Justices of the Court arrive at their decisions. As Mr. Justice Black stated
in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-259 (1958): "True, the question whether the
law of a State can be applied to a transaction is different from the question whether
the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the two are often
closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations."
67 Cf., Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 66, at 258-259-Mr. Justice Black's dissent.
68 Cf., minority opinion in Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 66, at 258-259, 262-263;
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-224 (1957); and International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 66, at 316-320, 323-324.
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arriving at a jurisdiction-or-no for the state court to act or by a
choice-of-law-or-no for the state court's action via its own policy
determinant? Might not, therefore, the doctrine of convenient
forum by a means, when used by the Court, to negate through
constitutional construction a public policy of a state? Justice Black
observed that many of the factors of finding proper jurisdiction
were similar to those used in finding choice of law even though
the two are different.9
Few would doubt, after reading these cases, 70 that jurisdiction,
as well as choice of law, depends very greatly upon what the Court
thinks are vital interests and vital contacts of the forum with the
transaction. It might seem, therefore, that any attempted use by
an insignificantly interested and little contact forum of its public
policy for jurisdictional (or choice of law) bases which undercuts
the least common denominator of the "Equation"-Order versus
Liberty in the federal-state relationship-will be seriously re-
stricted by the Court in constitutional construction. True enough,
the Court, viewing facts of a case subjectively, may divide in its
five-to-four 7 decisions, but that is a human factor that we are un-
able, at present, it seems, to rectify. That the Court's right to deny
a forum the right to act inequitably, unfairly, unjustly, and dis-
criminatorily in applying its public policy, when the contacts and
interests of the forum are insignificant, few, if any, would deny.72
If our analyses of the Hanson, McGee, and International Shoe
cases, supra, are correct, where do they leave us in regard to con-
stitutional limitations on the unfair, unreasonable, and arbitrary
use by an insignificantly connected forum, with little or no in-
terests in the agreement, of its public policy (or the public policy
of some other state, as seen by the forum, although similarly
situated in connections and interests as the forum) to negate
parties' stipulated place law which has reasonable connections
with, and vital interests in, an essential element of the contract?
69 Cf., Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 66, at 258-259.
70 I have used detail in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 68;
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 66; Hanson v. Denckla, supra note
66, for the purpose of bringing out in detail just such matters as indicated in this
paragraph.
71 For instance, observe Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 66.
72 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). "
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Although the cases immedately above were concerned primarily
with jurisdictional rather than with the choice of law aspects, it
seems that since some members of the Court 73 (possibly all of them)
view the factors in finding jurisdiction similar, in many respects,
to those of finding choice of law, that the Court would not be ad-
verse to parties' intended place law as long as the place had reason-
able connections with, and vital interests in, an essential element
of the transaction as viewed by the Court, while the forum had
insignificant contacts and interests. One possible observation might
occur. May not a forum with vital interests in and contacts with an
essential element of the transaction, as seen by the Court, use its
public policy (or the public policy of some other state which the
forum believes to have vital interests in and contacts with an
essential element of the transaction) to negate parties' stipulated
intent place law if the two are in conflict? In essence, therefore,
may not the public policy of the forum be used freely in the forum
as long as the forum's vital contacts and interests with an essential
element of the transaction fairly and equitably balance with similar
contacts and interests of any other state connected with the agree-
ment?
Let us turn to substantive due process of law74 for a few
moments to see if there is any change in our analyses.
In Home Insurance Company v. Dick,75 a technical domicil-
iary of Texas, Dick, brought action in a Texas forum against a
Mexican insurance company to recover on a fire insurance policy
for the loss of a boat. Jurisdiction was asserted in an in rem pro-
ceeding through garnishment by means of ancillary writs issued
against The Home Insurance Company and Franklin Fire Insur-
ance Company, which reinsured, by agreements with the Mexican
corporation, parts of the risk which it had assumed. Those gar-
nished were New York corporations; service was obtained upon
73 Note dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-259 (1958).
74 Historically, there has always been a dispute as to the meaning of "due process
of law." Does it relate to procedure only or does it have a more expansive base going
back to what has been denominated as "fundamental rights," which may be considered
larger than a mere formal legal procedure? Can we trace it to natural law concepts?
See, Mott, Due Process of Law iv, 1-3, 5-7, 10, 159, 161, 180-183, 254-255, 274, 278-279,
296, 590, 592, 593-594, 603-604 (1926); see also, Taylor, Due Process of Law and the
Equal Protection of the Laws viii, ix, xii, 5, 7, 8, 12-17, 19, 30, 35, 42-43 (1917).
75 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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them through their local agents in Texas pursuant to statutes of
that state which required the appointment of local representatives
by foreign corporations seeking business permits within the state.
The action in Texas was solely between Dick and the gar-
nishees, as the defendant (Mexican corporation) had never been
admitted to do business in Texas and had never done any business
there; also, the defendant, Mexican company, had never authorized
anyone in Texas to receive service of process for it or enter any
appearance in a Texas court. The Mexican corporation was cited
by order of publication under Texas statutes (public policy); at-
torneys for the Mexican corporation were appointed for it by the
trial court and they appeared unauthorized by the corporation on
its behalf. The attorneys filed an answer which denied any liability.
No contention existed that any in personam jurisdiction existed
over the Mexican corporation. Dick was attempting to garnishee
the two New York reinsurers for sums of money they might owe to
the Mexican corporation by virtue of the policy of reinsurance and
the subsequent loss of the insured boat.
The defense of the garnishees was, in essence, jurisdictional. 7
(This action was not begun for more than a year after the date of
the loss.) Said the Court (speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis):
The policy provided: "It is understood and agreed that no judicial
suit or demand shall be entered before any tribunal for the col-
lection of any claim under this policy, unless such suits or demands
are filed within one year counted as from the date on which such
damage occurs." This provision was in accord with the Mexican
law to which the policy was expressly made subject [stipulation for
Mexican law to control]. It was issued by the Mexican company to
one Bonner, of Tampico, Mexico, and was there duly assigned to
Dick prior to the loss. It covered the vessel only in certain Mexican
waters. The premium was paid in Mexico; and the loss was "pay-
able in the City of Mexico in current funds of the United States of
Mexico, or their equivalent elsewhere." At the time the policy was
issued, when it was assigned to him, and until after the loss, Dick
actually resided in Mexico, although his permanent residence
[domicile] was in Texas. The contracts of reinsurance were effected
by correspondence between the Mexican company in Mexico and
the New York companies in New York. Nothing thereunder was
to be done, or was in fact done, in Texas.77
76 May we not say that either a lack of jurisdiction or a limitation of jurisdiction
involved in the due-process-of-law concept in this case amounts to a jurisdictional issue?
77 281 U.S. at 403-404.
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Continued the Court:
In the trial court, the garnishees contended that since the insurance
contract was made and was to be performed in Mexico, and the one
year provision was valid by its laws, Dick's failure to sue within one
year after accrual of the alleged cause of action was a complete
defense to the suit on the policy; that this failure also relieved the
garnishees of any obligation as reinsurers, the same defense being
open to them ..... To this defense, Dick demurred, on the ground
that Article 5545 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes (1925) pro-
vides: "No person, firm, corporation, association or combination of
whatsoever kind shall enter into any stipulation, contract, or agree-
ment, by reason whereof the time in which to sue thereon is limited
to a shorter period than two years. And no stipulation, contract,
or agreement for any shorter limitation in which to sue shall ever
be valid in this State."78
Did the Texas law (public policy) violate due process of law?
We must observe at once the importance of characterization. Dick
characterized the assigned errors before the Court as pertaining
to local law so that his argument ran that while a provision which
required notice of loss within a fixed time is substantive because
it is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of suit, a
provision for liability only in case action is commenced within a
year is not substantive since it relates only to the remedy after
accrual of the cause of action; that while the validity, interpreta-
tion and performance of the substantive parts of an agreement are
determined by the law of the place where it was made and was to
be performed (a means of arriving, in many instances, at the intent
of the parties as to the law to control the agreement), matters which
relate only to adjective or remedial law are undoubtedly governed
by the law of the forum; and, that even if the court of Texas erred
(Texas held for Dick) in sustaining the statute applicable to this
agreement, the error was one of state law or of the interpretation
of the agreement, and should not be reviewable in the Supreme
Court.
The Court did not favor Dick's contention and, though it
stated it did not care how the question might be characterized,7 9
by its characterization it determined 0 the outcome of the case.
For the Court characterized the issue as one of substance and so
78 Id. at 404-405.
79 Id. at 406.
80 Id. at 406-407.
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governed by Mexican law-the law with the only significant con-
tacts with and vital interests in the transaction and the one stipu-
lated for control of the agreement by the parties to the contract.
Said the Court:
However characterized, it is an express term in the contract of the
parties by which the right of the insured and the correlative obliga-
tion of the insurer are defined. If effect is given to the clause, Dick
cannot recover from the Mexican corporation and the garnishees
cannot be compelled to pay. If, on the other hand, the statute is
applied to the contract, it admittedly abrogates a contractual right
and imposes liability, although the parties have agreed that there
should be none.""
Then the Court found that the Texas law (public policy) as
applied by Texas courts
deprives the garnishees of property without due process of law.
A State may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making of
certain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit
performance within its borders, even of contracts validly made
elsewhere, if they are required to be performed within the State and
their performance would violate its laws [public policy]. But, in
the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on,
or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be
done in Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy were
done in Mexico. All in relation to the making of the contracts of
re-insurance were done there [Mexico] or in New York. And, like-
wise, all things in regard to performance were to be done outside
of Texas. Neither Texas laws nor Texas courts were invoked for
any purpose, except by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact
that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas [domicile in Texas]
is without significance. At all times here material, he was physically
present and acting in Mexico. Texas was, therefore, without power
[jurisdiction] to affect the terms of contracts so made. Its attempts
to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize
property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the
guaranty against deprivation of property without due process of
law. Compailid General de Tabacos v. Collector of Internal Rev-
enue, 275 U.S. 87; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357. Compare Modern
Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551.82
Apparently, the Court thought that from the cases cited as
authority the same equitable principles of vital interests and im-
portant contacts applied equally to due process considerations as
to full faith and credit. The least common denominator factors of
constitutional construction-i.e., reasonableness, non-discrimina-
81 Ibid.
82 Id. at 407-408.
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tion, and equity-are self-evident in the Court's decision. It would
appear, therefore, looking backward from the International Shoe s8
case to the Dick84 case,. that the same fairness demanded by the
requirement that the forum have vital interests and important
contacts in order for it to have procedural due process jurisdiction
is similarly required for substantive due process jurisdiction.
Next, the Court in the Dick case placed the due process con-
stitutional limitation on improper use by the forum of its public
policy indirectly (if not directly) behind a reasonably connected
place law, stipulated-intent theory of the parties, when the place
law stipulated has vital interest in and contacts with the trans-
action. Said the Court:
The cases relied upon, in which it was held that a State may
lengthen its statute of limitations, are not in point . . . [citing
cases]. In those cases, the parties had not stipulated a time limit
for the enforcement of their obligations. It is true that a State may
extend the time within which suit may be brought in its courts, if,
in doing so, it violates no agreement of the parties. . . . When,
however, the parties have expressly agreed upon a time limit on
their obligation, a statute [public policy of forum] which in-
validates the agreement and directs enforcement of the contract
after the time has expired increases their obligation and imposes a
burden not contracted for.85
To paraphrase the Court above, Texas had no significant
contacts (as subjectively 6 seen by the Court) with the transaction;
it had no vital interest in the agreement; and to use Texas public
policy in such a case would be an inequity;87 further, it would be
unreasonable and discriminatory; it would upset the equation of
Order versus Liberty had it been a state-to-state Conflict-of-Laws
transaction and impinge on national88 policies as enunciated in
the Constitution. Although full faith and credit does not apply to
foreign nations' contract contacts, they do apply to due process
requirements. Therefore, with insignificant interests and contacts,
83 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
85 Id. at 408-409.
86 Note 8 supra.
87 Texas, with no vital interests and contacts with the transaction, would be acting
arbitrarily, unreasonably, unjustly, discriminatorily, and inequitably, if permitted to
apply its public policy to negate the parties' agreement and stipulated place law.
88 The concept of securing fundamental "rights" to citizens and others before
the courts of the realm was a tradition of the common law and possibly owed its origin
to theories of natural law. See Mott, op. cit. supra note 74, and Taylor, op. cit. supra
note 74.
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forum states will not be permitted to impinge on national policies
of federal-state relationship in either a Conflict-of-Laws intra-
Union contract or one involving a foreign nation and a state of the
Union. In attempting to balance legal duties and obligations
between parties to a Conflict-of-Laws agreement, the larger interest
of the nation (under Constitutional construction) in fairness,
justice, equity, non-discrimination and reasonableness must not be
trespassed upon by forums with insignificant contacts and interests
with the agreement. There must be law and order in the forum,
but the law and order of an insignificant-interest-and-contact forum
must be supervised by national constitutional concepts of law and
order based upon fairness-a vital factor in the least common
denominator of a federal-state relationship.
The Court, in conclusion, demolished the forum public-policy
argument in cases involving insignificant forum contacts and
interests with the transaction by stating:
Third, Dick urges that Article 5545 or the Texas law [public policy]
is a declaration of its public policy; and that a State may properly
refuse to recognize foreign rights which violates its declared policy.
Doubtless, a State may prohibit the enjoyment by persons within
its borders of rights acquired elsewhere which violates its laws or
public policy [note the use of the conjunction "OR" in last state-
ment]; and, under some circumstances, it may refuse to aid in the
enforcement of such rights. Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275
U.S. 274, 277-9; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412; com-
pare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230. But the Mexican corporation
never was in Texas; and neither it nor the garnishees invoked the
aid of the Texas courts or the Texas laws. The Mexican corpora-
tion was not before the court. The garnishees were brought in by
compulsory process. Neither has asked favors. They ask only to be
left alone .... It [the State] may not abrogate the rights of parties
beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be
done within them.89
A few words in analysis may be made. Unless the Court had
correctly characterized the issue at the start, the case might have
brought forth different results. Indirectly, the Court, by its
decision, was stating that an improper, inadequate, inequitable,
unreasonable, unfair, and discriminatory characterization by a
state court of issues before it, when important contacts and vital
interests are lacking in the forum, is limited by the federal Con-
stitution. Indirectly, if not directly, the peripheral bases of jurisdic-
89 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930).
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tion (substantive due process here, although procedural due process
in regard to bases of jurisdiction seem much the same) in the later
cases Shoe,90 McGee,91 and Hanson,9 2 were written between the
lines in Dick, either in what the Court said or what might be fairly
implied. If jurisdiction is based upon some form of power, and
power, in turn, upon just and equitable interests and contacts of
the forum with the transaction, then a re-reading of Dick may lead
us into Shoe, McGee, and Hanson. Even though the public policy
of a forum with vital interests and contacts with the agreement, or
that of some other state as seen by the forum as having similar
interests and contacts, may be used in not only jurisdictional
aspects, but choice-of-law aspects93 as well, the Court always has at
hand constitutional limitations9 4 on public policy usage unless
there are real and substantial interests and contacts95 that provide
more of an equitably balanced equation than any other foreign
state factually connected. In the Dick case, to have permitted Texas
policy to override Mexican policy would have brought forth an
imbalance in the equation of Order versus Liberty in a federal-
state relationship.
Although Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. was remanded
to the Florida state courts in order to ascertain the meaning of
a Florida statute (public policy), it would appear that the same
constitutional construction premise that underlies Dick,9 7 may be
found here as well. A citizen and resident of Illinois when the
contract of insurance was made in Illinois moved to Florida with
the insured goods. He became a Florida citizen (not a mere
technical domiciliary as in Dick) and resided there when the goods
in Florida were lost. The insurance company was licensed to do
business in both Florida and Illinois. The policy of insurance
covered "all risks" of loss or damage to certain personal property
having no fixed situs outside Florida; the policy was world-wide
90 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
91 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
92 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
93 Unquestionably, had Texas in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 89, had im-
portant contacts with the case the decision would have been quite different. Cf., Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
94 See Leflar, Conflict of Laws 242-244 (Student ed. 1959).
95 Cf., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., supra note 93, at 220.
96 Supra note 93.
97 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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in coverage. After more than twelve months from the discovery of
the losses, the plaintiff sued respondent in a Florida Federal Dis-
trict Court basing jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship. The
District Court awarded judgment for plaintiff upon the premise
that under Florida law (public policy) the losses were not excluded
from "all risks" coverage if such losses were caused by the deliber-
ate acts of plaintiff's wife and, further, that the suit was not barred
by a provision in the insurance that suit on any claim for loss had to
be brought within twelve months of discovery of the loss, even
though it would appear the court felt that a Florida statute would
forbid enforcement of such a clause while it was apparently valid
in Illinois. The Court of Appeals" reversed, finding that Florida
could not under the due-process clause apply its statute (public
policy) to the "suits clause" of the Illinois contract where such
clause was valid. The Supreme Court of the United States (strongly
dissented to by able Justices)99 held that the Court of Appeals
should not have passed on the constitutional question until first
passing on the two local law issues, and even then not unless its
decision on those local issues made a decision necessary on the con-
stitutional question.
Justice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion of the
Court. This opinion cited, with what appears to be apparent
approval, the Dick case.' 00 Also cited, with what may have been
apparent approval,' 0' was Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Delta & Pine Land Company,0 2 in which the Court had held
... that Mississippi could not constitutionally apply its own law
[public policy] to invalidate a contract clause limiting the insurer's
liability on a surety bond against defalcations by the insured's
employee "in any position, anywhere," to losses of which notice was
given within fifteen months after the termination of coverage. The
contract was made in Tennessee where the insured had offices and
the insurer was licensed to do business. Mississippi's claim was
struck down although the contract covered an ambulatory risk, the
default giving rise to the claim actually occurred in Mississippi,
the insurer was under license doing business there, and the insured
was incorporated there.'03
98 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
99 363 U.S. at 218.
100 Id. at 210, citing Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
101 Id. at 210.
102 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
103 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 210 (1960).
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Further, the Court in the Clay case observed Watson v. Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd.,10 4 where the Court,
• . . sustained Louisiana's application, in a suit by a citizen, of its
own "direct action" statute although thereby it invalidated an
express provision against direct liability of the insurer in a con-
tract negotiated and paid for within Illinois and Massachusetts, in
both of which the clause was valid. The contract insured Toni, an
Illinois corporation distributing its products nationally, against
liabilities arising from the use of the product. The insurer was a
British corporation licensed to do business in several States, includ-
ing Massachusetts, Illinois and Louisiana. Toni had no contact
with Louisiana and could not be served there. The Louisiana
plaintiff had sustained her injury in Louisiana. The Court found
Louisiana's contact with the subject justified its application of the
statute to make an insurer doing business in Louisiana amenable to
suit by a locally injured citizen.105
Even though the majority opinion in the case at bar admitted
that the ". . . relevant factors of the present case [Clay] are not
identical either with Dick, or Delta & Pine, or Watson and not one
of them can fairly be deemed controlling here .... "106 it would
appear (in spite of the remand to Florida) that there were sufficient
contacts in the Clay case with Florida for the application by Florida
of its law. In any event, it would appear from the significant
Florida contacts and interests with the transaction that the appli-
cation of Florida public policy would not be unfair, inequita-
ble, unreasonable, or discriminatory-the apparent factors of the
least common denominator of constitutional construction in such
matters.
In my opinion, the "Abstention Doctrine' 01°7 should not have
been used by the majority in the Clay case; rather, the opinion
of the minority,'0 written by Justice Black, concurred'0 9 in by
Justice Douglas (he also wrote a separate opinion)110 and Chief
Justice Warren,"' seems more in line with what an "Activist
Court ' 11 2 should do. The minority would not have awaited a
104 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
105 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., supra note 103, at 210-211.
106 Id. at 211.
107 See, Note, Federal Abstention-Due Process in Conflict of Laws in the Applica-
tion of the Lex Fori, 10 Am. U.L. Rev. 88 (1961).
108 363 U.S. at 213-227.
109 Id. at 227-228.
110 Ibid.
111 Id. at 213.
112 Compare Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court 118
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decision by the Florida state courts on local issues before deciding
the constitutional issue. From what Justice Black said, as well as
from what may reasonably be inferred, it appears that he felt that
Florida had a reasonable and sufficient contact (as well as vital
interest) with the transaction to decide the question by its laws
which would not infringe constitutional limitations on state
powers. To Justice Douglas, the use of Florida choice of law rule
would neither violate the "due process" nor the "full faith and
credit" clauses of the Constitution, since Florida not only had a
vital contact with, but vital interests in, the transaction.
Justice Black quoted with approval from Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,113 a statement by
Justice Stone (later Chief Justice Stone) that:
[T]he conclusion is unavoidable that full faith and credit does
not require one state to subordinate for its own statute [public
policy], applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting
statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling
force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the
same persons and events.114
Justice Black could not find it within constitutional mandate
for the court of one state (which had vital contacts and interests
with the transaction) to subordinate its public policy to the public
policy of another state which also may have major contacts and
interests with the transaction. He cited Griffin v. McCoach;15
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.;116 Pink v. A.A.A. Highway
Express;117 and Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,11Sas authorities
for his views. He readily admitted that fraternal benefit associating,
such as in Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,"'
seemed to admit of an exception to views of balancing state inter-
ests in a multistate factual situation wherein each state might usu-
ally (when each had significant interests and contacts) use in its own
courts its own public policy. But he thought that the nature of the
(1961); see also, Pusey, Struggle Inside the Supreme Court, The Saturday Evening Post,
Oct. 6, 1962, p. 22.
113 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
114 Id. at 502, cited in 363 U.S. at 218.
115 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
116 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
117 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
118 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
119 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
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society accounted for this exception. In other words, once the asso-
ciation is characterized 120 as a benefit society, Mr. Justice Black
thought that by the very nature of the society an exception might
exist as to the applicable law and jurisdictional bases for action so
that the use of public policy by the forum to attain (when it is also
the place of birth) the objective of more certainty in the law might
be justified. Thus, in fraternal benefit associations, constitutional
limitations on the forum's public policy usage seem, (when the
forum is at least the home of the society) in the least, abbreviated,
if not eliminated.
It may be doubted if this type of association comes under any
exception to the general rule. A view may be advanced that as the
Court observes today's needs and wants in the social unit in which
we live in time and space, it feels that it is still a necessity to but-
tress "Order" and "Certainty" in law'2' in the equation of Order
versus Liberty so that the ends of the social unit will be met in
fraternal benefit societies. Any legal equation should be based on
the ultimate goals of society-its needs and wants in time and
space. By-laws and constitutions of a fraternal benefit society that
regulate membership, etc., 122 may be made more certain 123 if
controlled as to legal requirements by the state laws of its charter.
Once the Court subjectively views the needs of society as dimin-
ished in regards to fraternal benefit associations, it seems that even
its "self-styled exception" may disappear. 2 "
Justice Black, in distinguishing the Dick125 case from the
Clay'2 6 case, stated that:
In the Dick case the Court's opinion carefully pointed out that the
decision in that case might have been different had the activities
relating to the contract there held binding in Texas been carried
on in that State [Texas]. And in the Delta & Pine Land Co. case, we
pointed out that the Court had considered that the Mississippi
activities in connection with the policy sued on there were found
120 See Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); and note 63, supra.
121 Note 26 supra, leads me into this assumption. Our Supreme Court is an able
one, but in dealing with complex problems of today, it may find itself perplexed in
decisional explanations.
122 Compare, Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, supra note 120.
123 Ibid.
124 See note 26, supra.
125 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
126 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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to be so "slight" and so "casual" that Mississippi could not apply
its own law. 27
It seems not unreasonable to state by inference from what Mr.
Justice Black said 28 that the minority (possibly, even the majority,
had the issues been in this case) might not have been unfavorable
to the usage of a stipulated law by the parties to control the
agreement had the parties stipulated for a law with reasonable and
most substantial connections with the vital elements of the trans-
action, as long as the place law stipulated for also had vital interests
in the agreement. It should be observed, though, that Justice
Black's opinion in the Clay case indicates that he would apparently
characterize contractual limitations much as any remedial statute
of limitations, and so might validate the forum's use of its own
public policy even at the expense of parties' stipulated law. Possi-
bly, we may reconcile these apparently conflicting views, at least,
as to the case at bar, by stating that since Florida had most vital
contacts and interests in the transaction (as I see it), that had the
parties stipulated for that law to govern their transaction it would
have undoubtedly been honored by the minority of the Court
(a minority today may be the majority tomorrow'2 9). In any event,
as viewed by a strong minority of the Court, the choice of Florida
law to govern the agreement apparently would not have been in
conflict with the least common denominator of constitutional con-
struction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The "Equation" would appear to have remained in balance.
Justice, equity, reasonableness, fairness, and non-discrimination as
factors in the least common denominator would not, it seems,
have been prejudiced by the choice of Florida public policy to con-
trol the case. One further observation seems pertinent. When the
Court apparently finds the major interests and contacts in balance
of the several states connected with the transaction, it seems reason-
able that the forum should be permitted to use its own public
policy, for to do otherwise would be most inequitable and unjust to
the forum. In such an event, the discrimination would run against
the forum with apparently no valid reason behind it. It would
127 Id. at 220.
128 Since Mr. Justice Frankfurter's departure from the Bench, it is most difficult to
surmise what a new majority would do under similar circumstances.
129 With the gradual shifting of Court membership brought about by age or
health, new majorities and new minorities are certain to occur.
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seem that equities must balance equities in any equation of life,
even in constitutional construction.
In New York Life Insurance Company v. Dodge, 30 an early
attempt was made by the Court to control a choice of law by means
of the due process clause. The insured, Mr. Dodge, was a resident
of Missouri. He made application in that state to the New York
Life Insurance Company for an insurance policy on his life. It
appears that the Company was chartered in New York, in which
state it also had its main office. The Company approved the insur-
ance application of Dodge and delivered to him in Missouri the
policy naming Mrs. Dodge as beneficiary. The agreement con-
tained the following provisions regarding the ability of the insured
to obtain any future loans from the Company on the policy:
Cash loans can be obtained by the insured on the sole security of
this policy on demand at any time after this policy has been in
force two full years. ... Application for any loan must be made
* . . to the Home Office... and the loan will be subject to the terms
of the company's loan agreement. . . . Any indebtedness to the
company ... will be deducted in any settlement of this policy .... 131
Later, the insured took advantage of these agreement provisions;
and, after the policy had been in being two years, he borrowed
annually from the Company. It seems that the procedure for mak-
ing these loans was that the insured was required to file an applica-
tion for the loan and sign an agreement in Missouri upon which
the Missouri local office of the Company forwarded all application
forms and agreement papers, together with a pledge of the policy
of insurance, to the New York main office of the Company. If the
Company approved, it then drew a check for the proceeds on a
local New York bank and mailed the check to the insured at his
home in Missouri. The loan contract provided that "principal and
interest are payable at said Home Office, and that this contract is
made under and pursuant to the laws of the State of New York,
the place of said contract being said Home Office of said Com-
pany." 132
Mr. Dodge borrowed over a period of several years. He then
missed payment of the premiums on the insurance policy. The
130 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
181 Id. at 368-369.
132 Id. at 371.
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Company, as permitted by New York law, then applied the cash
surrender value of the insurance policy to the payment of the
insured's indebtedness. Thus, the cash surrender value of the
insurance policy was exhausted and the policy was cancelled.
After this cancellation, the insured died. His wife, the beneficiary,
sued the Company in Missouri and claimed the full amount of
the policy less the unpaid premiums and loans. She alleged that
under Missouri law the company was not permitted to subtract
the full amount of the insured's indebtedness from the cash
surrender value of the insurance policy.
Under the Missouri law, it appears that there was a require-
ment that after the payment of three annual premiums, three
quarters of the new value of the insurance policy, minus any
indebtedness to the Company on account only of past premium
payments, should be used to buy insurance for the face amount of
the insurance policy. Did the Missouri statute apply or the New
York law? If the Missouri law applied, then it appears that the
policy would still have been in force at the death of the insured;
the contrary would be the effect if New York law applied. Missouri
favored the beneficiary.
The Court, upon appeal, reversed the Missouri courts. It
appears that the Court viewed the loan agreement as separate and
distinct from the policy; and, since it was made in New York, it
was a New York contract and controlled by that law. Even though
Missouri did have substantial contacts and interests in the trans-
action, New York interests and contacts were viewed as greater
since the loan agreement was a separate contract. The parties had
also stipulated for New York law governance of the loan arrange-
ments. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the Court, thought that
the insurance policy itself was a Missouri agreement and subject to
that law; however, the loan arrangements were separate agree-
ments; and, since the policy did not mandatorily require the Com-
pany to make the loans, the agreements for such were separate and
governed by New York law which was apparently the place of
greater contacts and interests. To do otherwise, reasoned Justice
McReynolds, would violate the insured's freedom of contract, for
Dodge could make a contract outside of Missouri even though he
was a resident therein. What part the stipulation for New York
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law to control the loan agreement had in the decision we can only
surmise. At least, it indicated the parties looked to New York law
for certainty in control of the transaction. If there was freedom of
contract on the part of the insured, the case seems logical. Other-
wise, there would be a taking by the Missouri courts of property
without due process of law.
In Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Liebing,13 3 the Court,
under somewhat similar facts to Dodge, found that the insurance
policy read: " '. . . the company will. . . loan amounts within the
limits of the cash surrender value .... , "134 although in Dodge the
provision was that " '. . . cash loans can be obtained.' "135 The
Court seemed to think that this difference in wording would make
a difference in decisional results between the two cases. Missouri,
in Liebing, was permitted to use its own law to regulate the loan
agreement terms. Possibly, we may say that Liebing met the normal
expectations of the parties to the agreement.
Certainly, few, if any, would disagree with the ruling of the
Court in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head.186 The insured,
Mr. Head, was a citizen of New Mexico. While he was temporarily
in Missouri, he applied for an insurance policy with a New York
insurance company. Again, somewhat like the loan arrangement in
Dodge,87 the application in Head stipulated that the insurance
policy, if and when issued in New York, should be considered as a
New York agreement. Although the insurance agreement was
delivered in Missouri to a friend of Mr. Head, and he in turn
delivered it to Head upon his next visit to Missouri, Mr. Head
then returned to New Mexico and transferred the policy to his
daughter. The daughter in New Mexico borrowed from the Com-
pany against the cash surrender value of the policy of insurance.
Under somewhat similar facts to Dodge, there was default in pay-
ment of the policy premium and the entire cash surrender value
was to pay off the indebtedness; then the policy was cancelled.
Upon a suit in Missouri by the daughter of Head, the beneficiary
in the policy, there was an attempt to use the Missouri law which
183 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
184 Id. at 209.
135 246 U.S. at 368.
136 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
187 Supra note 130.
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permitted only that part of the indebtedness due for past premiums
be deducted from the policy cash surrender value before the
purchase of policy paid-up insurance based upon any differential
left of the cash surrender value. When the Missouri court applied
the Missouri law (similar here to Dodge), the Court reversed.
Missouri had no contacts or interests worthy of mention with the
policy or any of the loan arrangements thereunder.
Again, what part the stipulated law had upon the transaction
we have no way of knowing, except by surmise. Certainly, in any
event, the law of Missouri had not sufficient contacts with the
transaction for its use.
I believe these cases add to our constitutional premise rather
than diminish it in any respect. Fairness demanded the decision in
each case.13 If there is freedom of contract in a Conflict-of-Laws
agreement, then it is primarily the parties' contract that is being
enforced and not that of a state. After all, what state should be
permitted to use its public policy to decide a case in validity of
Conflict-of-Laws agreements except the state law stipulated for by
the parties which has reasonable and important contacts with an
essential element of the transaction? Of course, the Court has a
most difficult task to determine the principles of most vital
interests, most important contacts, and freedom of the parties
from fear or restraint of one over the other to the transaction.
This, in some respects, requires a subjective appraisement by the
Court after analyzing each factual situation in a Conflict-of-Laws
agreement. As long as the Court attempts to deal fairly and without
discrimination with the parties' agreements so that their normal
and reasonable expectations will be met, there should be no com-
plaints.
(Part II of the article, dealing with Full Faith and Credit,
will appear in the Fall 1964 issue).
138 Compare with "A Premise of Constitutional Construction," supra at note 13;
observe note 4, supra.
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